l. Introduction
When several large-scale gas pipeline projects compete for a new gas market, the choices of the commercialization times (stopping times), i.e., the times of finalizing the construction of the pipelines, detennine the future structure of Lhe market and thus become especially important. In Ref. 1, which motivated the present study, a detailed pipeline model based on classical patterns of mathematical economics (see Refs. 2·--3) was designed and a best reply dynamic adaptation algorithm originating from the theory of evolutionary games (see Refs. [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] was used to estimate numerically the commercialization times for the pipeline projects competing nowadays for the Turkey gas market.
Rational choices of the commercialization times can be viewed as Nash equilibria in a game between the projects. In the present paper, we study the structure of this game. In order to make the model easily tractable in tenns of game theory (see Refs. 10---11), we introduce several simplifying assumptions; in particular, we reduce the number of competing projects to two. A background in the analysis of gas infrastructures (see Ref. 12 ) and problems of optimal timing (see Refs. [13] [14] is employed.
The model takes into account the stages of construction and exploitation of the gas pipelines. In each level, the model is optimized and estimated using appropriate techniques of the theory of optimal control and theory of differential games (see Refs. [15] [16] [17] . At the stage of exploitation, as gas supply policies compete on the market, decisionmaking is relatively clear: the competitors search for an equilibrium supply at any instant. Therefore, we focus on the stage of construction, at which investment policies compete and decisionmaking is concerned with strong long-term aftereffects. The competitors interact through choosing their commercialization times. A proper individual choice is the best response to the choices of the other competitor. Therefore, a pair of commercialization times is suitable to every competitor if and only if the commercialization time of every competitor responds best to the commercialization time of the other competitor. Such situations constitute Nash equilibria in the game under consideration. In this game, the total benefits gained during the pipelines life periods act as payoffs and the commercialization times act as strategies. Our goal is to characterize Lhe equilibria in this game, which will be referred to further as game of timing.
In Section 2, we describe the general two-player game of timing, in which the cost and benefit functions determining the players payoffa are not specified. Jn Section 3, we find the Nash equilibria in the game. A key point in the analysis is the observation that, for all players, the best response commercialization times concentrate at two instants that are fixed in advance.
This reduces decisionmaking to choosing between two fixed investment policies (fast and slow) with the prescribed commercialization times.
In Section 4, we describe an algorithm that finds all the Nash equilibria in the game of timing. In Section 5, we study the game of timing for the model of operation of gas pipelines which was described in Ref. 1 .
In Section 6, we give results of the model-based analysis for two case studies: competing gas pipeline projects in the Caspian region and planned pipeline routes to the gas market in China. Finally, Section 7 contains the proofs of the propositions formulated in Section 4.
Game of Timing
In this section, we construct a game-theoretic model of competition of two gas pipeline projects. We call it the game of timing. The pipelines are expected to operate at the same market. We associate players 1 and 2 with the investors/managers of projects 1 and 2, respectively. Assuming that the starting time for making investments is t = 0, we consider virtual positive commercialization times ! 1 and t 2 of projects 1and2 (i.e., the final times of the construction of the pipelines). Given a (virtual) commercialization time !;, player i, i = 1, 2, can estimate the cost C; (t;) for finalizing project i at time t;. The positive-valued cost functions C;(t;), i = 1, 2, are defined on the positive half axis. The following assumption will simplify our analysis. Assumption 2.1. For each player i, the cost function C;(t;) is smooth (continuously differentiable), monotonically decreasing, and convex.
A formal interpretation of Assumption 2.1 is that the derivative Cf (l;) = dC; (t;)/ dt; is negative and increasing. A substantial interpretation is that the cost of the project falls down as the project commercialization period is prolonged; moreover, the longer is the commercialization period, the less sensitive, with respect to its prolongations, is the rate of cost reduction. In what follows, the rate of cost reduction for player i is understood as the positive-valued monotonically decreasing function
a;(t;) = ·-C((t;) . (I)
Let us argue for player I as the manager of pipeline 1. At any time t > 0, the price of gas and costs for extraction and transportation of gas determine the benefit rate b 1 (t) of player l (note that this benefit rate is virtual, because t may precede the actual commercialization time of project I). The costs for extraction and transportation of gas do not depend on the state of project 2, whereas the price of gas depends on the presence (absence) of player 2 on the marketplace. In the situation where both players operate on the market, the price of gas should obviously be smaller compared to the situation where player 1 occupies the market solely. Hence, the benefit rate b 1 (t) may take two values, b 11 (t) and hdt), with
We call b 11 (t) the upper benefit rate and bn(t) the lower benefit rate of player 1 at time t. At time t (which virtually follows the commercialization time of player 1), player 1 virtually gets b 11 (t), if player 2 does not operate on the market, and gets b!2(t), if player 2 operates on the market. Similarly, we introduce the upper and lower benefit rates of player 2 at time t, b 21 (t) and b 22 (t), with
A time t, player 2 gets b 21 (t) , if player 1 does not operate on the market, and gets h 22 (t), otherwise. We assume that the positive-valued upper and lower benefit rates bi! (t) and bn(t), i = I, 2, are continuous functions defined on the positive half axis. We introduce also the following assumption .
Assumption 2.2. For every player i, i= 1, 2, the graph of the rate of cost reduction a;(t) intersects the graph of the upper benefit rate bil(t) from above at a unique point t;' > 0 and stays below it afterward; similarly, the graph of a;(t) intersects the graph of b;z(t) from above at a unique point 1; > 0 and stays below it afterward; more accurately, a 1 (t) > b 11 (t) for O<t < r; , a 1 (rj )=bn(tj), a;(t)<bil(t) for t>r; ,
Remark 2.1. Assumption 2.2 implies in particular that, if t > 0 is sufficiently small, the rate of cost reduction a 1 (t) is greater than the upper benefit rate bn (t); if t > 0 is sufficiently large, the rate of cost reduction a; (t) is smaller than the lower benefit rate ba(t).
Remark 2.2. Since a;(t)
is decreasing and b; 1 (t) >b;z(l) [see (2) and (3)], we have (6) The graph of the rate of cost reduction a; (t) and the graphs of the upper and lower benefit rates bn(t) and b;z(t) are shown schematically in Fig. I .
The fact that t 2 is the commercialization time of player 2 implies that player 2 does not operate on the market at any time t < t 2 and operates on the market at every time t?-t 2 . Accordingly, the benefit rate b 1 (t) of player 1 equals b 11 (t) for t<t 2 and equals bdt) for t?-t 2 . We stress the dependence of b 1 (t) on t 2 and write b 1 Ult 2 ) instead of b 1 (t) . Thus, given a commercialization time t 2 of project 2, the benefit rate of player 1 is found as if t<t 2 , ift2=!2 .
Similarly, a commercialization time t 1 of project 1 determines the benefit rate of player 2 as
The graphs of the benefit rates b 1 (t lt 2 ) and b 2 (tit 1 ) are shown schematically in Fig. 2 .
Given a commercialization time t 1 of player 1, and a commercialization time t 2 of player 2, the total benefits of players 1 and 2 are represented by the
,,
respectively. We make the following natural assumption. Given a commercialization time t 1 of player I and a commercialization time t 2 of player 2, the total profit of player i is defined as P;(t 1 , t 2 ) = · · · · C;(t;) + B;(t 1 , t2). (10) We are ready to define the game of timing for players 1and2 in line with the standards of game theory (see Ref. I I). In the game of timing, the strategies of player i, i = l, 2, are the positive (virtual) commercialization times t;, for project i; the payoff to player i, thanks to the strategies t 1 and t 2 of players I and 2, respectively, is the total profit P;(ti, t 2 ).
Nash Equilibria
According to the standard terminology of game theory, a strategy rt of player I is said to be a best response of player 1 to a strategy t 2 of player 2 if rr-maximizes the payoff P 1 (ti. t 2 ) to player 1 over the set of all strategies t 1 of player 1,
Similarly, a strategy c; of player 2 is said to be a best response of player 2 to a strategy t 1 of player 1 if r; maximizes the payoff P 2 (ti, t 2 ) to player 2 over the set of all strategies t 2 of player 2, P2Ct1 , t;) = ma 0 x P2Ct1, t2).
12>
Any pair (tt, 1;), where tt is a strategy of player 1 and t; a strategy of player 2, is said to be a Nash equilibrium in the game of timing if rt is a best response of player 1 to i; and r; is a best response of player 2 to it-Our goal is to characterize the Nash equilibria in the game of timing.
We start with a simple observation concerned with the dependence of the player payoff on the strategy of the other player. For example, let us consider the payoff Pi(t 1 , t 2 ) to player 1. The differentiation of Pi(ti, t 2 ) with respect to ti yields
Here, we have used (10), (1), (8) , and (7). Note that the above partial derivative exists and is continuous at any t 1 > 0 except for ti = t 2 . Geometrically, (11) means that P 1 (t 1 , t 2 ) grows in t 1 on the time intervals where the graph of a 1 (ti) lies above the graph of b 1 (tilt 2 ) an declines in 1 1 on the time intervals where the graph of a 1 (t 1 ) lies below the graph of b 1 (1ilt2).
Let us take two arbitrary strategics of player 2, t 21 and t 22 > 1 2 i. As (11) shows, for t1 < t2i and ti > !22, and for 1 21 < ti <t 22 . Recall that
see (2) . We have stated that, beyond the time interval located between t 2 i and t 22 , Pi(t 1 , t 22 ) and Pi(ti, 1 2 i) have the same rate in t 1 and, that within this time interval, P 1 (t 1 , tn) declines in t 1 faster than Pi(t 1 , t 2 i). Thanks to (8) and (7), Therefore,
Let us sum up the previous arguments in the following statement.
Proposition 3.1. For every t 1 >O, the payoff P 1 (ti, t 2 ) to player 1 increases in t 2 ; moreover, given a t 21 >0 and a t22>t 21 , one has P 1 (ti,t 22 )= P1(t1 , t21) for t 1 2:: t22 and P1(ti, !22) > P1(t1. t21) for t1 < t22.
The graphs of P 1 (li, t 2 ) for t 2 = t 21 and t 2 = t 2 2 > t 21 are shown in Fig. 3 .
A symmetric argument leads to a similar observation for player 2. Proposition 3.2. For every t 2 >O, the payoff P 2 (t 1 , t 2 ) to player 2 increases in t 1 ; moreover, given a t 11 >O and a t12>t 1 i. one has P 2 (t 12 , t 2 )= P2(t11, t2) for t2 2:: t12 and P2(t12, t2) > P2(t1 i. t2) for t2 < !12· Remark 3.1. The fact stated in Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 is intuitively clear: for the investor/manager of a gas pipeline project, any prolongation of the commercialization period of the competing project is profitable. Now, let us find the best responses (the best reply curve) of player I to a given strategy t 2 of player 2.
It is easy enough to identify lhe intervals of growth and decline of the payoff P 1 (t 1 , t 2 ) as a function of 1 1 • We use (11) and refer to the points(] and ((,at which the graph of a 1 (t) intersects the graphs of b 11 (t) and bn(t) ; see (4), 
r-·-
Assume first that t 2 ::::JI; recall that fl<tt [see (6)]. Then, as (4), (5), and Fig. 2 show, the graph of a 1 (ti) lies above the graph of b 1 (ti!t 2 ) fort 1 <ti and lies below it for t 1 > t7; at t 1 = t7, the graphs intersect. Due to (11) , oP 1 (ti, t 2 )/ot 1 is positive for t 1 < t7, t 1 -:tt 2 , and negative for t 1 > tt, Therefore, t 1 = t'j' is the unique maximizer of P 1 (ti, t 2 ) in the set of all positive t 1 ; in other words, t7 is the single best response of player I to strategy t 2 of player 2.
Let us assume that t 2 ?:: t7. Then, (4), (5) , and Fig. 2 show that the graph of a 1 (t 1 ) lies above the graph of b 1 (tilt 2 ) for t 1 <fl, and lies below it for t 1 >ti;
at t 1 = t7, the graphs intersect. Figure 4 (b) illustrates the relations between the graphs. Due to (11), oP 1 (ti. t 2 )/ot 1 is positive for t 1 < r 1 · and negative for t 1 > (), t 1 -:tt 2 • Hence, t 1 = t"I is the unique maximizer of P 1 (t 1 , t 2 ) in the set of all positive t 1 ; i.e., ti is the single best response of player 1 to t 2 • Now, let t 2 lie in the interval [ti, t-rJ. Then, (4), (5) , and Fig. 2 show that the graph of a 1 (ti) lies above the graph of h 1 (tilt 2 ) for t 1 < tj, lies below it for ti< t 1 < t 2 , lies again above the graph of b 1 (ti!t 2 ) for t 2 < t 1 < t7, and lies again below it for t 1 >tr Figure 4 (c) illustrates the relations between the graphs. Thanks to (1 I), we conclude that P 1 (t 1 , t 2 ), as a function of t 1 , strictly decreases on the interval (0, tj), strictly decreases on the interval (ti·, t 2 ), strictly increases on the interval (t2, t7), and strictly decreases on the interval ur' co).
Therefore, the maximizers of P 1 (ti, t 2 ) in the set of all positive ti, i.e., the best responses of player 1 to t 2 , are restricted to the two-element set {ti, ir }.
Let us identify the actual maximizers in this set. We refer to Proposition Let us consider the function that associates to each strategy t 2 of player 2 the set of all best responses of player 1 to t 2 ; we call it the best response function of player I. The graph of the best response function of player I is shown in Fig. 5 The set of all best responses of player 2 to i 1 is { t2, t~}. If 0<t 1 < i 1 , then the unique best response of player 2 to t 1 is t;. lf t 1 > 1 1 , then the unique best response of player 2 to t 1 is lz.
We call t2 the fast choice of player 2, rr the slow choice of player 2, and 1 2 the switch point for player 2. We introduce also the best response function ' 1 of player 2, which associates to each strategy t 1 of player 1 the set of all best responses of player 2 to t 1 . The graph of the best response function of player 2 is shown in Fig. 5(b) . Here, the independent variable t 1 is shown on the vertical axis and the best responses of player 2 are located on the horizontal axis. belongs to the intersection of the graphs of the best response functions of players 1 and 2. Figure 5 shows that the graphs necessarily intersect. Figure 6 gives an example of the intersection.
For each intersection point [i.e., each Nash equilibrium (r7, c;)J, point r7
is the fast or slow choice of player 1, and point 1; is the fast or slow choice of player 2. In case c7 is the fast choice of player 1 and r; the slow choice of player 2, we call (r7, r;), the fast-slow Nash equilibrium; similarly, we define the slow-fast, fast-fast, and slow-slow Nash equilibria. Nash equilibria of different types arise under different relations between the players fast and slow choices and the switch points of their rivals. The list of all admissible cases is as follows: Let us consider in more detail the most interesting situation where the game of timing has two Nash equilibria, fast-slow and slow-fast; i.e., (19) or 
P1(/I, i2)= P1(t~, i2)=P1(t;,t;).
Thus, for the fast-slow and slow-fast equilibria (ti-, 1n and ((i, t:2), we have Pi (r 1 , t~-) 2': P1 (t7, t;J.
!Vforeover, the inequality is strict if f 2 <tr_ If this is so, player I prefers the fast-slow equilibrium; otherwise, the fast-slow and slow-fast equilibria arc equivalent for this player. Similarly, we state that, if f 1 < tt, player 2 prefers the slow-fast equilibrium; otherwise, the equilibria are equivalent for this player. Thus, generally, each player prefers his fast equilibrium.
Let us give an exact formulation. In other words, the slow-fast equilibrium is strictly preferable for player 2.
In the symmetric case, where the fast-slow and slow-fast equilibria are equivalent to player 2, i.e., we find similarly that the fast-slow equilibrium is strictly preferable for player 1. Thus, in those exceptional cases where one of the players has no preference in choosing an equilibrium, the other player strictly prefers his fast equilibrium. C 2 (t) and B 1 (t, s) = Bl(s, t) , for all positive t and s.
Then, the game of timing takes a symmetric form. The players have the same fast and slow choices and switch times, Hence, (19) and (20) hold. By Proposition 3.5, the game of timing has the fast-slow and slow-fast equilibria. The inequality i 2 <1; is equivalent to i 2 < t'{, which holds trivially [see (6)). By Proposition 3.6, we conclude that Similarly, we find that Thus, in the symmetric game of timing, player 1 prefers the fast-slow equilibrium and player 2 prefers the slow-fast equilibrium. Obviously, the situation does not change if the parameters of projects 1 and 2 are sufficiently close to each other. The question of a practical choice of an equilibrium in the case where the players have different preferences arises. Here, we do not argue on this; we note only that game theory does not provide any clear recommendations in this respect.
Solution Algorithm
For convenience, we represent the obtained classification of the Nash equilibria in table form (see Table 1 ).
We conclude the general part of our study with the description of an algorithm that finds the Nash equilibria in the game of timing. The algorithm refers to the definitions of the players fast and slow choices r; and it, i = 1, 2, the players switch times i;, i = I, 2, and Table 1.
Step I. Use definitions (4) and (5) for finding the players fast and slow choices i;-, and i;, i::: 1, 2.
Step 2. Use definitions ( 14) and ( 15) for finding the players switch times f;, i = 1, 2.
Step 3. Use Table 1 for identifying the Nash equilibria. In this section, we apply the suggested solution method to a model described in Ref.
I. Wishing to demonstrate a clear analytic result, we consider a simplified version of lhe model. Namely, we eliminale the price of liquid natural gas, which acts as an upper bound for the price of gas in the original model; we do not introduce the upper bounds for the rates of supply or the pipelines capacities; we assume that the costs for extraction and transportation of gas are functions of time only; finally, we analyze the competition of two pipeline projects (as our theory prescribes).
The model is as follows . 
The dynamics of x;(t) is modeled as x;(t) = -ax;(t) + ri(t).
(25)
Here, CT' is a positive obsolescence coefficient and r is a delay parameter, located strictly between 0 and 1. In the terminology of control theory (see Ref. 15) , the cost C;(t;) is defined to be the optimal value in the problem of minimizing the performance index f;(r;) for the control system (26), (24), subject to the boundary constraints (25).
The upper and lower benefit rates b; 1 (t) and bdt) for player i at time t > 0 are found as equilibrium payoffs in the static supply game modeling the instantaneous gas market. In the supply game arising at time t, the strategies y; of player i are nonnegative rates of supply and the payoff to player i is defined as (27) Here, y is the total rate of supply, ;r(t, y) is the price of gas, and c; (t) > 0 is the cost for extraction and transportation of gas for player i. The price of gas is modeled as
where g(t) > 0 is the consumer GDP at time t and /3 is the inverse to the price elasticity of gas demand; we have 0</3< 1.
The total supply y equals y; if player i occupies the market solely and equals y 1 + .Y2 if both players operate on market.
The next proposition gives the expressions for the costs C;(t;). rates of cost reduction a;(t;), and upper and lower benefit rates bn(t 1 ) and bri(t;), i = 1, 2. We need the following assumption. 
where
(c) The upper benefit rate bn (t;) is given by
bil(t) = e-J.1(1-[3)1 /{3 ·-lg(t) / c; 1f3 -1(t).
(33) (d) If Assumption 5.1 holds, the lower benefit rate b; 2 (t;) is given by
(e) Under Assumption 5.1, the following inequality is valid :
see (2) and (3 ).
Jn what follows, we assume that c;(t), i = I, 2, and g(l) are defined on the positive half axis and are continuous. We also fix the functions described in Proposition 5.1 and introduce the next assumption.
Assumption 5.2. For i = 1, 2, the functions 
Note that g 0 is the consumer GDP at time 0 and c? is the cost for transportation and extraction for player i at time 0.
The theory described earlier for the general case is applicable for the model considered. Namely, the following is true. Step 1. Solve equations (40) and (41) for finding the players fast and slow choices ti and ti , respectively, i:::: I, 2.
Step 2. Use equalities (14) and (15) for finding the players switch times i;, i = 1, 2.
Step 3. Use Table 1 for identifying the Nash equilibria in the game of timing.
As a specific example, let us consider the case described in Remark 5.2. Thus, in what follows , we assume that g(t) and c;(t) , i = 1, 2, arc given by (37) and inequality (38) is satisfied. Formulas (33) and (34) for bi! (t) and b;i(t) are specified as where l/f=A-K,
Using the definition of the total benefit Bi (ti, t 2 ) of player i [see (8) and (9)] and the expression (29) for the cost Ci(t,), we find an explicit formula for the total profit Pi(t 1 , tJ [see (10)] of player i, which is determined by the player strategies t 1 and t 2 . We have
P2(t1,l2)= -pa-1e-J. . . '2xf j (I-e-P'2 t ·-I
+ {b~I e -1/f lt I VI+ (b~2 -b~1)e• I/flt I v1, 
Recall that, by Proposition 3.3, the critical points ii and i 1 needed for the identification of the type of the equilibria in the game of timing (see Table  1 ) are found from the equalities P1(fj,i2)=P1(tt,i2) and P1(ii,t2)=P1U1,t;), respectively. In the situation considered now, the critical points are given explicitly. The next proposition is true. 
where l; is defined by (47) and z; = xf(c~ + c~)
Thus, under the assumptions of Remark 5.2, the suggested solution algorithm for the game of timing (Section 4) takes the following form.
Step 1.
Step 2.
Step 3.
Solve equations (46) and (49) for finding the players fast and slow choices r; and rt, respectively, i = 1, 2.
Use formula (44) for finding the players switch times i;, i = 1, 2.
Use Table I for identifying the Nash equilibria in the game of timing. based on preliminary expert estimates. Our first case study deals with the competition of two major gas pipeline projects in the Caspian region , the Blue Stream Project of the Russian GAZPROM Company (project 1), which is aimed at delivering Russian gas to Turkey under the Black Sea; and the Trans-Caspian Project (project 2) directed from Turkmenistan underneath the Caspian Sea through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Turkey. In this case study, the parameters of the model are chosen as follows: discount rate /t. = 0.1; obsolescence coefficient a= 0.3; delay coefficient, r= 0.65; inverse to the price elasticity of gas demand f3 = 0.55; initial level of the consumer GDP g° = 214.6; growth rate of the consumer GDP ;= 0.1; growth rate of the extraction costs w = 0.15; initial extraction costs c? = 67. 3, cg= 78.4; commercialization levels of the accumulated investments .x 1 = 4.0, . x 2 = 2.5. It is assumed that the projects start in 2001. For these parameters, there exist two Nash equilibria in the game of timing, the fast-slow equilibrium Ui, in= (2002.8, 2005.2) and the slow-fast equilibrium 
with i,j = 1, 2, it:j, for project l (Blue Stream) and project 2 (Trans-Caspian)
under the fast-slow Nash equilibrium investment scenario (t1i t 2 ) =(ti, ti) and the slow-fast Nash equilibrium investment scenario (t 1 , t 2 ) =(ft, t2), respectively. The heavy line and the fine line show the NPV dynamics of Blue Stream and Trans-Caspian, respectively. Our second case study is related to the planned projects of gas pipelines from Russia to China. Two potential competitors on the North China gas market are the Kovikta-Zabaikalsk-Kharbin pipeline (project 1) stretched from the [rkutsk region to North China, and the Sakhalin-KhabarovskKharbin pipeline (project 2). The following values of the model parameters are chosen: .x, =6, . :?2 = 3 . Minoullin .
Appendix: Proof of the Main Results
Here, we prove Propositions 5.1 to 5.4.
Proof of Proposition 5.1.
Step 1. Formula (29) was obtained in Ref. 14.
Step 2. The differentiation of (29) 
(1 -e p1,)20:
• e--At;
For the last transformation, we have used the equality
following from (30) and the notation (32). For a;(t;) = -C/(t;) [see (1)], we have (31).
Step 3. Assume that player i occupies the market solely. Then, the price is given by (53)
The supply game is reduced to an optimization problem, and bn(t) is found as the maximum of p; (y;lt) over all positive J';-Since p; (y 1 lt) is strictly concave in y 1 , its maximum is reached at the unique point y;(t) >Osuch that dp;( y;(t) it) j dy; = e·,ttg(tJ '8[(1 --{3) 
Recall that b;1(t) = p;(y,(t)lc)
and substitute y 1 = y 1 (t) into (53). We get
bil (t) = e ·).t[gf1(t)/l -C;(t)]y;(t)
= e· ;. i.e., (33) holds.
Step 4. Now, let Assumption 5.1 hold and let both players operate on the market. Then, and for the payoff to player i, we have (54) Let us show that the instantaneous supply game has a unique Nash equilibrium under Assumption 5. 
The latter is necessary for (Yi.Yi) to be a Nash equilibrium in the supply game. Hence, if the Nash equilibrium exists, it is unique. Point (_vi, y 2 ) given by (58) has positive components due to Assumption 5.1; See (28) . Moreover, (y 1 ,y 2 ) satisfies (56), where y = y 1 +Yi, which is equivalent to (55). Hence, (y 1 ,y 2 ) is the Nash equilibrium . We have stated that a unique Nash equilibrium exists. Denote it (y 1 (t),y 2 (t)). By (58), we get By definition, Substituting y,. = y;(t), i = I, 2, into (54) and noticing that is given by (57), we get b,. 2 
and finally, Formula (34) is proved.
Step (29)) is continuously differentiable. The expression (52) for C/(t) shows that C!(l) < 0. Hence, C; (t) is monotonically decreasing. Consider the ratio in the right-hand side. The numerator e-Ar'x; decreases in t; and the denominator (1 ---e-P' 1 )'~ increases in l;. Hence, the ratio decreases in f;. Since the square bracket decreases in l;, its product with the ratio decreases in !; . As a result, we conclude that C;'(t;) increases in f; . We have shown that Assumption 2.1 is satisfied.
Let us turn to Assumption 2.2. For the rate of cost reduction, we have the expression (31) whose denominator tends to 0 when t approaches 0. Hence, a;(l) tends to infinity as t approaches 0. Therefore, for all t > 0 sufficiently small, we have
a;(t) > bil ( t) > bdt).
The expression for a; (t) and b; 2 
where ho.(t) is given in (36) and h 0 (t) is such that, for some r>O and e >O, the lower bound inf,.,,,,h 0 (t) > e holds. By Assumption 5.2, h(t) tends to infinity as t tends to infinity. Therefore, for all t sufficiently large, we have ....
g -e . ·--e , I\, ve .
Using the notations (47) and (48), we arrive at equation (46).
Step 2. Due to (37), equation (41) 
Conclusions
The paper is devoted to the analysis of a two-player game, in which the players strategies are the times of terminating the individual dynamical processes. The formal setting is related to the management of large-scale innovation projects, whose key feature is that the profits gained through the implementation of the projects are highly sensitive to the projects commercialization times. The basic reason for that is that the price formation mechanism changes rapidly the price as a new project is commercialized and the supply sharply increases. This situation is analyzed in the context of the competition of two projects on the construction of gas pipelines. In the game between the projects, the total profits gained during the pipelines life periods act as payoffs and the commercialization times as strategies. The reduction of project management to choices of the commercialization times is justified by the assumption that the individual regulation mechanisms, comprising investments into the construction of the gas pipelines and regulation of supply, work optimally provided the commercialization times are given . The analysis of the game leads to the restriction of the player rational choices to no more than two prescribed combinations of commercialization times, which constitute the Nash equilibria in the game. Typically, two Nash equilibria arise and the projects compete for a fast commercialization scenario; its complement, a slow commercialization scenario, is less profitable, representing the best response to the fast scenario of the competitor. A simple algorithm for finding the Nash equilibria is described.
